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*Comp. Law. 215 There is now an extensive literature chronicling the barriers that liquidators face in
trying to bring avoidance proceedings under the Insolvency Act 1986.1 One such barrier is the
treatment of the liquidator's legal costs. Broadly speaking, the liquidator is entitled to an indemnity out
of the company's assets in relation to the costs incurred should the action fail.2 However, the value of
the indemnity depends on whether the costs are treated as an expense of the liquidation ranking for
payment ahead of preferential creditors and any floating charge. In Re MC Bacon (No. 2), 3 Millett J.
held that the liquidator could not recoup the costs of an unsuccessful action against the defendant
bank as a liquidation expense. The liquidator contended that his costs should be treated as an
expense “properly chargeable or incurred by … the liquidator in preserving, realising or getting in any
assets of the company” within rule 4.218(1)(a) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. The judge ruled that the
relevant cause of action was not an asset of the company as it vested in the liquidator and only arose
after the liquidation had commenced.4 It followed that the costs were not incurred in realising or
getting in “any assets of the company” for the purposes of rule 4.218(1)(a). The apparent
consequence of MC Bacon (No. 2) is that the liquidator's costs of proceedings under sections 213,
214, 238, 239 and 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 can only be recouped from assets available for
distribution to unsecured creditors and therefore rank as an unsecured claim. The decision has been
described as “a formidable obstacle to those who wish to encourage liquidators to take on avoidance
actions”.5 However, as the Court of Appeal's decision in Re Floor Fourteen Ltd, Lewis v.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue 6 shows, MC Bacon continues to find favour in the higher courts.
In Floor Fourteen the company was in voluntary liquidation. Its liquidator applied for a declaration that
he was free to use asset realisations in his hands to fund preference and wrongful trading
proceedings against the company's former directors.7 The directors and preferential creditors
contended that the liquidator was not at liberty to use the assets to meet the costs of the proposed
litigation in the light of Re MC Bacon. The preferential creditors (meaning the various Crown
agencies, including the Inland Revenue, whose claims enjoy preferred status under section 386 and
Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1986) had an axe to grind because their claims rank for payment
after liquidation expenses by virtue of section 175(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986. At first instance,8
the deputy judge declined to follow MC Bacon, preferring instead the contrary view expressed obiter
by Phillips and Morritt L.JJ. in Katz v. McNally. 9 He held that costs could be recouped as an expense
under section 115 of the Insolvency Act 1986 as long as they were properly incurred and that this was
so whether or not they fell within rule 4.218(1). He based his conclusion on the view that section 115
should be read as being logically prior to rule 4.218(1). This rule, the deputy judge said, merely
determines the order in which certain expenses are paid. It did not bar the court from treating other
items of expenditure as an expense within section 115 and according them priority. Contrary to
received wisdom, the deputy judge also indicated that the recoveries of successful preference or
wrongful trading proceedings would, in any event, fall within rule 4.218(1)(a). He took the view that
any monies recovered became assets of the company within the rule at the point of recovery, albeit
assets held subject to the statutory trust for unsecured creditors. He agreed that rule 4.218(1)(a)
could not extend to the costs of unsuccessful proceedings as these did not produce an “asset”.
However, for good measure, he held that costs could be recouped under rule 4.218(1)(m) as a
“necessary disbursement”, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings, as long as the costs were
rendered necessary by the proper performance of the liquidator. For all these reasons, the deputy
judge felt able to grant the liquidator's application. The preferential creditors appealed on the ground
that, although the court had a discretion to allow the liquidator to recoup his costs as an expense,
recoupment was not an automatic right. In their view, the effect of the deputy judge's decision was to
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entitle the liquidator, in advance and as of *Comp. Law. 216 right, to treat the costs of the proposed
litigation as an expense. Their problem was that the costs of proceedings might well exhaust the
available assets whereas, on an immediate distribution, they would be paid out of the assets ahead of
unsecured creditors.10
The appeal was allowed. In delivering the court's judgment, Peter Gibson L.J. both restated and
clarified the orthodox position taken in MC Bacon. The court considered itself bound by its own earlier
approval of MC Bacon in Re RS&M Engineering Co. Ltd, Mond v. Hammond Suddards. 11 First, it
disagreed with the deputy judge on the relative status of section 115 and rule 4.218. By a combination
of section 411 and Schedule 8, paragraph 17 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Act contemplates that
the Insolvency Rules will make provision for what fees, costs, charges and other expenses can be
treated as liquidation expenses. With this in mind, Peter Gibson L.J. thought that it would produce an
odd result if section 115 were to be construed as meaning that all winding-up expenses have priority
as long as they are properly incurred. In his view, section 115 deals only with the priority of expenses
as against other claims, e.g. those of preferential creditors and unsecured creditors. It is rule 4.218
that determines which expenses are to be treated as liquidation expenses in the first place. Rule
4.218 also governs how those expenses rank for payment inter se. It follows that the liquidator can
treat any costs falling within rule 4.218(1) as liquidation expenses and recoup them as of right.
However, section 115 does not confer an independent statutory right on the liquidator to recoup costs
falling outside rule 4.218(1) as an expense. It was critical therefore to determine whether the costs of
the proposed litigation were caught by rule 4.218.
On this question, the Court of Appeal was emphatic in its support for MC Bacon. Successful
avoidance or wrongful trading proceedings do not involve the “preserving, realising or getting in [of]
any of the assets of the company”. Any monies recovered in such proceedings do not represent
property of the company existing at the commencement of the liquidation as the rights of action arise
only after liquidation and can only be pursued by a liquidator.12 The costs of recovery cannot therefore
fall within rule 4.218(1)(a). The court agreed with the deputy judge that the costs of unsuccessful
proceedings could not fall within rule 4.218(1)(a). However, it rejected his view that such costs were
“necessary disbursements” within rule 4.218(1)(m).
In line with MC Bacon and Mond, the Court of Appeal assumed that the court did have a residual
discretion to allow the liquidator to recoup costs not falling within rule 4.218 from the company's
assets in his hands. Peter Gibson L.J. was disinclined to speculate as to the precise source and
scope of the discretion. It was suggested that the court should adopt a cautious approach in
exercising the discretion, especially in cases where preferential creditors who might otherwise receive
a dividend object to the use of the available assets to fund speculative litigation. It was felt that there
was insufficient information before the court for it to be able to exercise the discretion in the present
case. However, it was accepted that the liquidator was entitled to make a fresh application on fuller
evidence to the Companies Court.13 It is clear from both Floor Fourteen and Mond that the same
principles would apply in compulsory liquidation.
There are very good reasons why the courts were anxious to prevent the liquidator recovering the
costs of unsuccessful litigation as an expense in the cases of MC Bacon and Mond. In MC Bacon, the
object of the proceedings had been to avoid the defendant's floating charge. If the liquidator had been
allowed to recoup his costs as an expense, the floating charge vindicated in the proceedings would
have been subordinated to the costs of an unsuccessful challenge to its validity. In Mond, it was held
that the funds in the liquidator's hands were caught by a floating charge. As in MC Bacon, it would
have been unfair if the court had allowed the liquidator to recoup his costs from funds to which the
chargeholder had successfully established he was entitled in the litigation. However, considerations of
this nature were not in play in Floor Fourteen. Overall, the position for liquidators remains uncertain.
The Court of Appeal's acknowledgment that there is a residual discretion is of little encouragement.
No one is sure how this discretion operates. At the moment, it is nothing more than a vague gloss on
the statutory provisions. The best one can say for Floor Fourteen is that it does conclusively settle the
question as to the precise relationship between section 115 and rule 4.218. Unfortunately, it remains
difficult for liquidators to contemplate proceedings unless unsecured creditors can be persuaded to
provide a fighting fund. There is, of course, now the option of conditional fees. However, even if the
liquidator can engage his own legal team on a “no win, no fee” basis, he remains liable to pay the
other side's costs if the proceedings are unsuccessful. It is possible to insure against this risk but
so-called “after the event” insurance is not cheap.14 At the moment, conditional fees are the only
realistic option as other creative attempts to spread the liquidator's risk, for example by assigning a
future share of recoveries to a funder in return for financing and protection on costs, have been
blocked by the courts.15 If we seriously expect liquidators to make use of the armoury at their
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disposal, then a strong case can be made for a full review of the expenses rules at least insofar as
they apply to the costs of insolvency litigation. At the very least, they should be updated to take
account of the conditional fee regime. It is the writer's view that Floor Fourteen does not even
guarantee that the liquidator can recoup the premium payable for adverse costs insurance as of right.
It must be arguable that recoupment should be allowed in the exercise of the residual discretion. A
better option from the point of view of insolvency practitioners would be to amend rule 4.218 to make
it clear that the premium is a “necessary disbursement” falling within rule 4.218(1)(m) which could
therefore be recouped as of right. Removal of the Crown's preferential creditor status would also have
helped in the present case!
Adrian Walters Editorial Board
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